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Abstract—Technology has positive impacts on many aspects
of our social life. Designing a 24 hour globally connected
architecture enables ease of access to a variety of resources and
services. Furthermore, technology like the Internet has been a
fertile ground for innovation and creativity. One such disruptive
innovation is blockchain – a keystone of cryptocurrencies. The
blockchain technology is presented as a game changer for
many of the existing and emerging technologies/services. With
its immutability property and decentralised architecture, it is
taking centre stage in many services as an equalisation factor
to the current parity between consumers and large corpora-
tions/governments. One potential application of the blockchain
is in e-voting schemes. The objective of such a scheme would
be to provide a decentralised architecture to run and support a
voting scheme that is open, fair, and independently verifiable.
In this paper, we propose a potential new e-voting protocol
that utilises the blockchain as a transparent ballot box. The
protocol has been designed to adhere to fundamental e-voting
properties as well as offer a degree of decentralisation and allow
for the voter to change/update their vote (within the permissible
voting period). This paper highlights the pros and cons of using
blockchain for such a proposal from a practical point view in
both development/deployment and usage contexts. Concluding
the paper is a potential roadmap for blockchain technology to
be able to support complex applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voting, whether traditional ballet based or electronic voting
(e-voting), is what modern democracies are built upon. In recent
years voter apathy has been increasing, especially among the
younger computer/tech savvy generation [1]. E-voting is pushed
as a potential solution to attract young voters [2, 3]. For a
robust e-voting scheme, a number of functional and security
requirements are specified [4]–[6] including transparency,
accuracy, auditability, system and data integrity, secrecy/privacy,
availability, and distribution of authority.
Blockchain technology is supported by a distributed network
consisting of a large number of interconnected nodes. Each
of these nodes have their own copy of the distributed ledger
that contains the full history of all transactions the network
has processed. There is no single authority that controls the
network. If the majority of the nodes agree, they accept a
transaction. This network allows users to remain anonymous.
A basic analysis of the blockchain technology (including smart
contracts) suggests that it is a suitable basis for e-voting and,
moreover, it could have the potential to make e-voting more
acceptable and reliable. There are number of papers that have
explored this idea [7]–[9] including now this one.
Obvious advantages of e-voting using blockchains includes:
i) greater transparency due to open and distributed ledgers,
ii) inherent anonymity , iii) security and reliability (especially
against Denial of Service Attacks) and iv) immutability (strong
integrity for the voting scheme and individual votes). Existing
works explore how blockchains can be used to improve the e-
voting schemes or provide some strong guarantees of the above
listed requirements. However, these papers do not discuss the
implementation challenges and limitations of the blockchain
(and smart contract) technologies at their current state to fully
support a large scale voting scheme. In this paper we explore
both the possibilities of an e-voting scheme, along with the
challenges and limitation of the blockchain technology in the
e-voting context.
A. Contribution of the Paper
Contributions of the paper can be summed up as below:
1) The paper proposes an e-voting scheme based on
blockchain technology that meets the fundamental e-voting
properties whilst, at the same time, provides a degree of
decentralisation and places as much control of the process
in the hands of the voters as was deemed possible.
2) Discussion on the implementation challenges and underly-
ing platform’s (blockchain and smart contracts) limitation
to support the e-voting proposal.
A short discussion about e-voting schemes is provided in
section II. Protocol used as part of the proposed e-voting
scheme is analysed in section III. Implementation and operation
evaluation is provided in section IV.
II. E-VOTING
Voting mechanisms using electronic means, or ’e-voting
mechanisms’, to aid casting and counting votes have been
studied in both the commercial and the academic world.
A. Design Properties
In order for an e-voting protocol to be deemed secure certain
formally-stated properties must hold.
• Fairness: No early results should be obtainable before the
end of the voting process; this provides the assurance that
the remaining voters will not be influenced in their vote.
• Eligibility: This property states that only eligible voters
should be allowed to cast their vote and they should do
so only once. The basis of this property is authentication,
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Properties ProtocolsBitcongress Follow My Vote TIVI
Fairness No No No
Eligibility No (One Bit-
coin addr. one
vote)
Yes Yes (Unclear
how)
Privace Yes Yes Yes
Individual Veri-
fiability
Yes Yes Yes
Universal Verifi-
ability
Yes Yes Yes
Forgiveness No Yes (Unclear
how)
Yes (Unclear
how)
TABLE I: Commercial blockchain e-voting protocols overview
since voters need to prove their identity before being
deemed eligible or not.
• Privacy: The way that an individual voter voted should
not be revealed to anyone. This property in non-electronic
voting schemes is ensured by physically protecting the
voter from prying eyes.
• Verifiability: This property guaranties that all parties
involved have the ability to check whether their votes
have been counted or not. Typically two forms of verifi-
ability are defined, individual and universal verifiability.
Individual verifiability gives an individual voter the ability
to verify that one’s vote has been counted. Universal
verifiability requires that anyone can verify that the
election outcome is the one published.
• Coercion-resistance: A coarser should not have the ability
to distinguish whether a coerced voter voted the way they
were instructed to.
It is within the scope of the paper to conceive of a protocol
that has the aforementioned properties. However Coercion
resistance will not be actively pursued since it was deemed
not possible to be achieved purely with technological means in
a remote e-voting protocol. The protocol does however have
the property of Forgiveness that can be perceived as a weaker
notion of the coercion-resistance property.
• Forgiveness: The ability of a voter to alter ones vote
after it has been cast. This property links to coercion
resistance because it provides a coerced voter the option
of changing ones vote at a later stage in order to reflect
ones true opinion.
B. Blockchain e-voting
The utilisation of Blockchain technology in e-voting appli-
cations is not a new thing. Many schemes have been proposed;
however, most of those protocols lack proper documentation
and questions remain about their internal workings. Table I,
gives an overview of the degree to which three of the most
well documented and popular, commercial, remote e-voting
protocols, namely BitCongress [10], Follow my Vote [11] and
TIVI [12], satisfy the fundamental e-voting properties.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The motivation behind the proposed e-voting protocol, is to
have a blockchain based scheme that meets the above stated
goals. In addition to those properties the protocol must allow for
a voter to change one’s mind and cancel one’s vote, replacing
it with another.
As a secondary goal, it has been actively pursued to provide
the maximum degree of decentralisation and to create a protocol
which the voters control as a network of peers. After careful
consideration, however, it was decided that a certain degree of
centralisation is necessary to reach the primary goal. This is
because when using the blockchain, one is unable to store secret
information in the public ledger without the use of external
oracles that maintain such information. So if the identity of the
voters is to remain secret, whilst at the same time permitting
only eligible voters to participate in the elections, a Central
Authority needs to be introduced that acts as a trusted third
party.
The proposed voting protocol utilises the blockchain to store
the cast ballots, therefore in this context the blockchain acts
as a transparent ballot box. The main reason for using the
blockchain in an e-voting protocol is to take advantage of the
fact that it enables a group of people to maintain a public
database, that is owned, updated, and maintained by every user,
but controlled by no one. Since the protocol is based on the
blockchain, it will be realised as a network of peers. Each
voter will be a peer i.e. a node in a network of equals. Every
voter will be responsible for making sure that fraudulent votes
are rejected, hence that consensus is maintained according
to the election rules. The blockchain also has the additional
advantage of being increasingly well-known and well-trusted
to operate as intended, as evidenced by the sheer size of the
cryptocurrency market.
A. Notations and Definitions
During the description, of the protocol terms like voter, ballot
and vote will be used. A list of all notations used, are also
provided in Table II.
TABLE II: Notation used in protocol description.
i : Voter i.
Vipub : Public key of voter i, uniquely identifying Vi, also serves
as signature verifying key.
Vipriv : The private counterpart of Vipub, used as a signing key.
SigCA(X) : Digital signature produced by the CA over message x.
Ci : Voter i’s choice in the election.
dci : Digital commitment for Ci.
oi : dci opening value. Ci cannot be derived from dci without
the opening value.
x|y : Inclusion of value x and y in a single message
eti : Eligibility token, eti = SignCA(Vipub|dci)
:
1) Voter: A voter, identified by one’s public key, Vipub, is
considered an entity that is permitted to cast a vote towards one
of the candidates. A voter also has the ability to cast an Invalid
vote as a form of protest, that will not be counted towards the
end result, but will however, be logged in the system. Voters
will be able to access the e-voting platform through a voting
client, installed in their device of preference, the security of
which is assumed. The terms client and voter will be used
interchangeably to describe the entity acting as the voter.
The voter, during the election, will be called to make a
choice, Ci that can range from a set of predefined choices, to
protest messages. In order to assure fairness, the voter will
reveal only a digital commitment over said choice, dci and
will reveal the choice itself only during the counting stage of
the election.
2) Central Authority (CA): In order for the e-voting protocol
to provide assurance that only eligible voters are able to vote, it
was deemed necessary for a Central Authority to be introduced.
For a user to be judged eligible, one must authenticate oneself
to the Central Authority, CA, and receive a token that proves
one’s eligibility to vote. The eligibility token, eti, takes the
form of a digital signature over a voters Vipriv and dci.
eti = sig(Vipub|dci)CA (1)
For the CA to judge whether voters are eligible or not, it is
required for it to maintain a list of all the voters that are allowed
to participate in the elections. . The CA is also required to have
access to voter authenticating information in order to have the
ability to authenticate eligible users. The method the CA will
deploy to authenticate the voter, is application dependent.
3) Vote: A vote is a message of predefined structure, that
is the equivalent of a bitcoin transaction. A vote is required to
include a ballot and any other information that the practical
implementation of the protocol requires it to include. Each
vote x, once included in the blockchain is identified by a vote
ID, V IDx, a value that uniquely recognises a vote.
4) Ballot: A ballot, bi is the digital representation of the
physical ballot, i.e. the paper where the choice of a voter is
written on. A ballot is considered sealed when the opening
value of the digital commitment has not been revealed and,
thus no party, other than the voter, can determine the way a
voter voted. Once the opening value has been revealed and the
choice of the voter is publicly known, the ballot is considered
open.
bialt = Vipub|dci|eti (2)
A ballot is considered sealed when the opening value of the
digital commitment has not been revealed and, thus no party,
other than the voter, can determine the way a voter voted. Once
the opening value, oi, has been revealed and the choice of the
voter is publicly known, the ballot is considered open.
The public key, included in the ballot denotes the owner
of the ballot and by extension the owner of the vote. This
ownership property enables the protocol to support a different
kind of ballot namely the alteration ballot.
5) Alteration Ballot: The alteration ballot serves the purpose
of enabling voters to alter their vote, that has already been cast
in the blockchain. The alteration ballot, bialt, is comprised of
the following elements:
• A statement of the voter that has voted x, with unique
ID, V IDx, will be cancelled, c(V IDx) and should not
be counted towards the end result. Vote x, must already
exist in the blockchain.
• The public key of the Voter, Vipriv, that also acts as the
signature validating key.
• The new commitment of the voter, dcn encapsulating the
voter’s new choice.
bi = c(V IDx)|Vipriv|dcn|sig(c(V IDx)|Vipriv|dcn)Vi (3)
B. Voting Phases
The protocol has been divided in four distinct phases, namely
the, initialisation phase, the preparation phase, the voting phase
and finally the counting phase.
1) Initialisation phase: During the initialisation phase, the
rules governing the elections are determined and the CA, the
blockchain and all other systems of the protocol are initialised.
The organisers of the elections will be called to decide, amongst
others, on what the duration of the individual protocol phases
will be and on whether vote cancelation will be permitted
or not. The rules will then be publicised and a CA and a
blockchain infrastructure will be created governed by those
rules.
The CA during the initialisation phase will be provided the
list of the eligible voters that are eligible to vote as well as a
way to authenticate those users. A pair of signing and verifying
keys for the public signature scheme will be generated and the
verifying key will be publicised as a system wide parameter.
The blockchain will be initialised with an initialisation
block, that will serve as the genesis block, of the chain. The
initialisation block does not contain any votes, but instead it
contains all the information of the election, including the CA’s
signature validating key, the set of valid choices the voters can
choose from and so on. This way a blockchain is tied to a
specific election and all the system parameters become part
of the blockchain and thus dispute over them is prevented. A
visual representation of the blockchain is depicted in Fig. 4s,
where the election blockchain can be seen, comprised of singly
linked blocks containing votes with unique VIDs, where the
first block contains election specific information.
Fig. 1: Vote alteration
2) Preparation phase: During this phase, Vi, using the client
application of the e-voting platform, is called to authenticate
oneself to the Central Authority. The CA will use the list of
eligible voters along with the authentication information, it
acquired during the initialisation phase, to determine whether
the aspiring voter is eligible to vote. If the voter is judged
eligible, the CA will proceed to the following steps, otherwise
Vi is rejected and the CA, does not proceed with the rest of the
phase. All the following information will be exchanged through
an authenticated and secure chanel. financial transactions , over
an unreliable channel.
Once deemed eligible, the Vi’s client will generate a public
key pair, whose public counterpart Vipub, will be used as a
pseudonymous identity of the voter and will also serve as
one’s verifying key. It will also prompt the voter to make one’s
choice, ci of the predetermined choices that will be accepted
by the system and a digital commitment scheme will be used in
order to generate dci, the digital commitment of one’s choice.
To prove one’s eligibility to the system the voter needs to
send both dci and Vipub to the CA to be signed by it. To
avoid the possibility of the CA linking a voter’s true identity to
ones vote a blinding signature scheme will be used. The client
will apply a blinding function on the message, blind(Vipub|dci)
and send it to the CA that will then sign the blinded message
and send it back. Once the message is received, the client
will unblind the signed message sig−1(sig(Vipub|dci)CA) =
sig(Vipub|dci)CA and will end up with a valid eligibility token
eti.
3) Voting phase: During the voting phase, every Voter
constructs and then broadcasts to the network their vote. Each
voter is also responsible for collecting votes, validating them
and inserting the valid ones in the blockchain. In order for
a voter to accept a vote as a valid one and include it in a
block, one will make sure that the owner of the vote has not
previously cast that vote. One will also have to make sure that
CA’s signature included in the ballot is validated and that the
vote adheres to the predefined structure. If any of those checks
fail the vote is discarded as an invalid one.
The protocol provides the option to allow voters to change
their vote even after those votes have been cast, through the use
of the alteration ballot bialt. Since the alteration ballot includes
a valid signature over the new ballot and the same public key
validates both the alteration ballot and the previously cast vote,
the network will accept bialt, include it in the blockchain and
proceed with including it in the count instead of the cancelled
one. Ballot cancelation can be performed multiple times and
only the final ballot will be included in the count.
4) Counting phase: During the counting phase, all voters
are called to reveal their final choice by broadcasting to the
network a ballot opening message, obi, containing the VID of
their final vote in the blockchain, the opening value of their
vote commitment, and a signature over both values.
5) Counting phase: During the counting phase, all voters
are called to reveal their final choice by broadcasting to the
network a ballot opening message, obi, containing the VID of
their final vote in the blockchain, the opening value of their
vote commitment, and a signature over both values.
obi = V IDx|oi|sig(V IDx|oi)CA (4)
All nodes of the network will be responsible for collecting
the ballot opening messages and verifying that the signature
validates with the public key of the owner of vote V IDx. If
the signature is verified, the voters will then broadcast the
messages to their adjacent peers. And proceed with including
the vote in their count. All peers should reach the same result
since they operate on the same blockchain.
C. Protocol Analysis
In the following paragraphs, the extent to which the protocol
satisfies the e-voting design properties will be examined, in
order determine if the property is held.
1) Eligibility: In order for a vote to be included in the
blockchain and thus considered cast it needs to include a valid
ballot. Each ballot needs to include a valid signature of the CA,
over Vipub and dci, otherwise it is dropped by the network. The
CA provides signatures only to authenticated voters that have
been included in the list of eligible voters compiled during the
initialisation phase and that haven’t requested to vote before.
This means only eligible voters can vote and they can acquire
only one eligibility token and thus cast only one valid vote.
The eligibility property also breaks when an eligible voter
succeeds in casting a vote more than once. This, however,
is not possible since all nodes, during the voting phase, will
refuse to include to the blockchain a vote that has already been
cast. The only vote accepted by the network after Vi has voted
will be an alteration vote and since it bears a valid signature
of Vi only the owner of the vote to be canceled can produce.
The vote alteration process can be better illustrated in 1 where
a voter, Vi, with public key Vipriv , just cast an alteration vote
with VID=45. That new vote cancels another, previously cast,
alteration vote with VID=29 that in turn cancelled Vi’s original
vote, VID=22.
Since the original vote includes proof, issued by the CA,
that the holder of public key Vipriv is eligible to vote and both
vote 29 and 45 have, provably, been issued by the same entity,
vote 45, that will be counted towards the final tally, is the vote
of an eligible voter.
2) Privacy: The protocol guarantees that at no point during
the protocol run, any party can determine how a voter voted.
The only link between the real identity of the voter and one’s
vote is an individual’s public key that acts as a pseudonymous
identity. The only entity that would potentially uncover said
link would be the CA, since it is the only entity that the voter
would need to reveal one’s true identity to in order to obtain
proof of one’s eligibility, during the preparation stage.
In order to avoid any party from being able to identify how a
voter voted, a blind signature scheme is used. Blind signatures,
provide a way for the central authority to produce a valid
signature on the digital commitment and public key of a voter,
without being able to determine neither the public key nor the
digital commitment.
The privacy of the voter is maintained, even with the addition
of the voting alteration mechanism since the fact remains that
the only entity that can link a public key with a real-life identity
is the CA and the CA does not gain any additional knowledge
with the introduction of that mechanism.
3) Fairness: The protocol provides a guarantee that the
results will not be known during the voting phase and, thus,
no voters will be swayed. This is achieved through the use
of a digital commitment scheme and by separating the voting
stage from the counting stage. The voters during the first three
stages of the protocol will not make their choices known but
will instead include in the ballot a digital commitment of said
choice. The ballot will be opened, only during the counting
phase, when the voters will reveal their choice by broadcasting
the opening value of the digital commitment. If votes are
revealed before the counting phases, they should not count
towards the end result.
4) Individual verifiability: Due to the public nature of the
ledger, each voter can verify that one’s vote has been inserted
in the blockchain, thus has been counted. Each voter is also
responsible for counting the votes and thus one can ensure that
the result includes one’s vote.
5) Universal verifiability: Since the ledger is public, every
voter can verify that the votes have been counted correctly, by
simply counting the votes. External auditors can also verify the
results by obtaining a copy of the blockchain, making sure that
the votes in it are legitimate, e.g. that signatures are validated,
duplicates don’t exist etc. and once all checks are complete,
auditors can count the votes and compare their results against
the official election tally. The fact that rules governing the
election are included in the genesis block of the blockchain,
further facilitates the election’s verifiability since their integrity
is guaranteed and thus disputes over them become irrelevant.
D. Further considerations
The CA, is the only centralisation point of the protocol and
it is assumed to be trusted. However, if the CA breaks that trust
in the current setting, it could arbitrarily cast votes for voters
that haven’t voted. If the CA would not surpass the number of
voters that participate in the election, those fraudulent votes
could not be detected. This is why all voters should cast
their vote. An additional failsafe would be to introduce a
multisignature scheme where more than one independent CAs,
would need to sign an eligibility token in order to produce a
valid signature over it. Each CA would maintain only part of
a voters’ authenticating information, thus making it impossible
for one to impersonate another voter. It should be noted that
the introduction of additional CAs does come with an overhead
and it is something that should be considered.
Since only voters are allowed to participate in the elections,
the suggested blockchain to be used is a Permissioned one.
The voters can use their eligibility tokens, as proof that they
can participate in the blockchain. This makes the environment
inherently more secure.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONAL EVALUATION
In this section, we will give an example of an implementation
of this proposed protocol.
A. Implementation Details
For this implementation, we have decided to use a private
network that uses the Ethereum blockchain API. The reasoning
behind this decision is that Ethereum is a widely recognised
and popular technology. Comparative protocols are likely
also implemented on Ethereum, thus giving a better basis
of comparison with protocols with similar goals.
When creating applications that use Ethereum, computational
expenses impacts the design choices. With Ethereum, this
computational expense is manifested in the form of ’gas’. Gas
is a unit of measure that decided the computational expense
of a contract. Gas is priced by the node wishing to push the
node to the wider chain, and this price will be paid to the node
that mines that transaction. Nodes, therefore, are attempting
to maximise profits by determining the worth of a transaction
verses the computational cost. As a result, to make a blockchain
application viable (and to ensure that their transactions aren’t
always being past over by the mining nodes), the computational
expense has to be minimised. This is less true in a private
network. By merit of being a part of a private network, we can
assume that the nodes have other stakes in the chain. In this
instance, that is the right to vote. Still, computation still has
attached expenses. There are ethical complications in charging
voters for the right to vote, particularly if that cost is high. A
means to circumvent this would be to have a gateway node
that is sponsored in some way by the election hosts. This node
could then be used by voters without the means to join the
private network by staking computational power. This needs
to be balanced by a sufficient number of nodes participating.
Nevertheless, the need to minimise computational expense has
played a role in the design decisions made.
Algorithm 1 Initialisation Phase
1: procedure ELECTIONGENE-
SIS( candidates, pubk, lengthPhaseOne,
lengthPhaseTwo, cancelBallots)
2: candidates← candidates
3: pubk ← pubk
4: electionEndT ime ← timeNow() +
lengthPhaseOne
5: countEndT ime ← electionEndT ime +
lengthPhaseTwo
6: cancelBallots← cancelBallots
Contract Time (secs) Cost (gas)
1 50 577207
2 53 577207
3 55 577207
4 54 577207
5 56 577207
6 55 577207
7 59 577207
8 56 577207
9 56 577207
10 54 577207
Average 54.8 577207
TABLE III: Election Genesis: Contract Deployment
1) Initialisation Phase: During the initilisation of an elec-
tion, a genesis contract must be placed on the blockchain
(Algorithm 1). This genesis contract contains all of the
information that will be necessary to validate the ballots as
they are placed, ensuring that none are placed after time, that
none are placed without the appropriate signed token, and that
alteration ballots are not cast if the election forbids such ballots.
This contract will also contain other information that should
be publicly available to everyone participating in the election.
Such information includes the list of candidates that can be
voted for and the timing for all of the phases of the election.
When the contract is created, this information will be passed
in by the client responsible for pushing the contract to the
blockchain. It will then be stored in the contract state.
2) Voting Phase - Initial Ballot: In order to place a
ballot on the blockchain, (Algorithm 2) the voter must have
first communicated with the CA to receive a signed token
authorising the ballot. When they make their submission, the
voter must include the component parts of this signed token
(separation of the token into it’s component parts costs too
much gas on the blockchain to be considered feasible).
Algorithm 2 Voting Phase - Initial Ballot
1: procedure PLACEBALLOT(vid,vote,msghashed, v,r,s)
2: require((timeNow() < electionEndTime) And (verifyTo-
ken(msghashed,v,r,s))
3: new InitialBallot(vid, vote)
4: procedure INITIALBALLOT( vid, vote)
5: vid← vid
6: vote← vote
7: sealed← true
8: unsealedT imeStamp← null
Along with the candidate that they have voted for, the voter
must also submit a VID that will be used to uniquely mark this
vote. This is to prevent a voter from placing multiple bids on
the blockchain (where more than one is not an altering ballot).
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Fig. 2: Contract timing for Initial Vote Over Ten Trial Ballots
The message token is verified to have been signed by the
public key belonging to this election, and the current time is
checked to ensure that the vote is not being placed after the
election end.
Only after these requirements are met can the ballot be
created. The VID and vote are set on this ballot contract. The
ballot is also set to sealed and the unsealedtimeStamp, which
is used to denote the time at which a vote was retrieved, is
set to null as it has yet to be retrieved. This contract is then
pushed to the blockchain.
3) Voting Phase - Alternate Ballot: The process for pushing
an altering ballot, (Algorithm 3) is similar to the process for
creating an initial ballot. The voter must have a signed token
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Fig. 3: Individual Initial Vote’s GAS usage (x 105)
authorising the ballot. When they make their submission, the
voter must include the component parts of this signed token.
Along with the candidate that they have voted for, and the
unique VID, the candidate must also indicate the previous ballot
that is being altered. The VID of this previous ballot must also
include the address, to be extracted by the evaluating client
code. The validation as to whether this is a legitimate altering
ballot is not done until the counting phase. This decision was
made, in part, because of the lack of support that Solidity
(the language contracts on the Ethereum blockchain) has for
extrapolating transactions from the blockchain. Moreover, the
decision was made not to keep a store of the addresses of the
previously placed ballots - it was too computationally expensive
as this would involve altering state.
Algorithm 3 Voting Phase - Altering Ballot
1: procedure PLACEALTERBALLOT(vid,vote,msghashed, v,r,s)
2: require((timeNow() < electionEndTime) And (verifyTo-
ken(msghashed,v,r,s) And cancelBallots)
3: new InitialBallot(vid, vote)
4: procedure ALTERINGBALLOT( vid, vote, replacedBallot)
5: vid← vid
6: vote← vote
7: replacedBallot← replacedBallot
8: sealed← true
9: unsealedT imeStamp← null
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Fig. 4: Contract timing for Altering Vote Over Ten Trial Ballots
The message token is verified to have been signed by the
public key belonging to this election, the current time is checked
to ensure that the vote is not being placed after the election
end, and, in this instance, the rules of the election are checked
to ensure that altering ballots are permitted.
Only after these requirements are met can the ballot be
created. The VID and vote are set on this ballot contract. The
ballot is also set to sealed and the unsealedtimeStamp, which
is used to denote the time at which a vote was retrieved, is
set to null as it has yet to be retrieved. This contract is then
pushed to the blockchain.
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Fig. 5: Individual Altering Vote’s GAS usage (x 105)
4) Counting Phase: Once the election has concluded, votes
will need to be counted (Algorithm 4).
When the vote is retrieved from the ballot, if this is the first
time that the vote has been retrieved, the ballot will be marked
as unsealed. The time at which this retrieval was made is also
recorded.
Algorithm 4 Counting Phase
1: procedure RETRIEVEVOTE
2: require(electionEndTime < timeNow())
3: if isSealed then
4: isSealed← false
5: unsealedT imeStamp← timeNow()
6: return(vote)
The VID of the vote is publicly available. If this is an altering
ballot, the replaced bid VID is also available. It is at this point
that the altering bids can be checked for their validity before
the vote is counted.
Security is ensured by the fact that every node on the private
blockchain has access to this information also and so can
independently verify the final count.
5) Challenging The Count: Nodes on the blockchain also
have functionality to examine the blockchain (Algorithm 5).
On top of the publicly readable information, such as the VID,
the nodes can also explicitly and easily retrieve information
such as the current sealed state of a ballot and the time at
which the ballot was unsealed. If they have reason to contest
whether a ballot was opened early, or not included in the count,
the information given here may support the argument.
Algorithm 5 Challenging Count
1: procedure RETURNSEALED
2: return(isSealed)
3: procedure RETURNTIMEUNSEALED
4: return(unsealedT imeStamp)
V. CONCLUSION
E-voting, as discussed in the paper, is a potential solution
to the lack of interest in voting amongst the young tech savvy
population. For e-voting to become more open, transparent,
and independently auditable, a potential solution would be
base it on blockchain technology. This paper explores the
potential of the blockchain technology and its usefulness in
the e-voting scheme. The paper proposes an e-voting scheme,
which is then implemented. The implementation and related
performance measurements are given in the paper along with
the challenges presented by the blockchain platform to develop
a complex application like e-voting. The paper highlights
some shortcomings and presents two potential paths forward
to improve the underlying platform (blockchain technology)
to support e-voting and other similar applications. Blockchain
technology has a lot of promise; however, in its current state it
might not reach its full potential. There needs to be concerted
effort in the core blockchain technology research to improve is
features and support for complex applications that can execute
within the blockchain network.
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